



Virtual Ethnographic Study on Radicalism

Dudy Imanudin¹ Lili Awaludin^{2*} Ahmad Sarbini¹

Abstract

This article is the result of a research on radicalism in Indonesia. Radicalism is an extreme act carried out by certain people or groups. Radical movements use the potential of human resources to mobilize members, create networks, coordinate activities, and motivate people to create conflict and confrontation. The radicalism movement can be manifested in active fighting for ideals by developing and intensifying issues about politics *counter-discourse* or *counter-domination* of the state and society. Radicalism studies are needed as a first step to model responses, whether carried out by the government or community institutions. This article uses a virtual ethnographic methodology. The process is by tracing the digital footprint of religious organizations' views on radicalism, in this case, specifically the views of Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and Persatuan Islam (PERSIS). The analytical approach uses rational-emotive counseling diagnosis. The results of this study are expected to contribute to the parties concerned about the model of prevention of radicalism in the counseling analysis approach.

Keywords: radicalism, virtual ethnography, rational-emotive counseling

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¹ Faculty of Communication, Sunan Gunung Djati State Islamic University, Bandung, Indonesia

² Faculty of Humanities, Sunan Gunung Djati State Islamic University, Bandung, Indonesia

* Corresponding author, E-mail: liliawaludin@uinsgd.ac.id

1. Introduction

Radicalism is a belief or view which strongly and strictly upholds the principles of a religion based often on a rigid and literal translation of a holy book. According to Hidayat (1996, p. 137), radicalism is a religious movement which gives limited portion for the mind in interpreting and understanding religious texts. Historically, the term radicalism is closely related with the emergence of fundamentalism as an attribute of the Protestant sect that considers the Bible as something absolute and literally faultless. In the context of some Protestant Christian sects, questioning a word in the Bible is considered as an unforgivable great sin, or inerrancy. In its development, faith based fundamentalist movements emerge from every world great religion or creeds, not only from Christianity and Islam, but also from the Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, and Confucianism (Griffin, 1989). Moreover, according to Graudy (2000), fundamentalism is not limited to religion, but it can also apply to political, social, and cultural sector. Fundamentalism is a view based on beliefs, whether it is religious, political or cultural, held by the founders who indoctrinate the teachings until one day it becomes a social norm¹ (Griffin, 1989; Habermas, 2002).

In the Indonesian New Order era (Orde Baru), religious fundamentalist movements increased in intensity into radicalism. The movement of these religious radicalisms had a certain pattern. The movements were characterized by the ideologization of certain teachings based on religious interpretations of several particular groups. Ideologization becomes a guideline for those religious group movements, especially an Islamic one in which the religion has been considered as the vision and ideological as a basis of the concept. From this basic assumption, a segment of Islam developed into and is interpretatively understood as an egalitarian, populist, action oriented, and militant religion. Historically, the seeds of radicalism were stirred by politically marginalized groups during the era of Sukarno and through the New Order era (under Soeharto).

In the Reformation era, the stabilization process of radicalization progressively revealed its identity. Previously conducted preliminary study by Wahid Institute (WI), proved that Muslim groups assumed to experience a movement shift showed

¹ According to Geraudy (2000, p. 13), the term of "fundamentalism" was not an entry in popular dictionaries before the third millennium. Up until 1996 this word was practically unknown in the *Ruber Big Dictionary*. Until 1968, *Encyclopedia Universalis* did not include this term as an entry.

a significant development.² The development was the formation of a strong and solid network expanded from several groups. These groups formed a large structural network, from the national hierarchy to the regional one(s) as the lowest level. From these groups, the radicalization of Islamic movements was born and established in various forms of social-political actions, such as ideological conflicts, discords, protests, or resistances were embryos for a radical movement.

The research on radicalism has been conducted by Maarif Institute in mid-December of 2015 and published in the Indonesian national news media, Kompas (Kuwado, 2016). The seed of radicalism amongst Indonesian teenagers is in a concerning stage. This research was conducted toward 98 high school students who attended Maarif Institute Jamboree. One of the question points raised to the students was, "Are you willing to conduct aggression toward people or groups who are considered to have insulted Islam?" The result shows that 40.82% of the respondents were willing, and 8.16% were very willing. Meanwhile, 12.24% answered that they were not willing to conduct aggression and 25.51% were less willing.

As for the research conducted by Setara Institute,³ the result concludes that the intolerance taught by hardline or radical Islamic groups is the starting point of terrorism (Setara Institute, 2012). There are several resemblances between intolerant radical groups and terrorist groups, among those that support and or adhere towards an interpretation of Islamic sharia law implementation in relation to what they regard as sinful, and establishment of an Islamic state. Those similarities gave birth to a hypothesis that radical Islamic groups have considerable potentials to transform these groups into terrorist groups. This hypothesis was later bore out by a research

² The preliminary study was conducted by WI. This institution was established since September 7, 2004. The WI is an institution aiming to realize the principles and intellectual ideals of Abdurrahman Wahid in shaping the moderate Islamic teachings that support democracy, multiculturalism, and tolerance in Muslim communities in Indonesia and other parts of the world. In its every program, WI conduct events in progressive Muslim activist communities and dialogues among religious leaders and political figures in Islamic and Western world (Wahid Foundation, 2016).

³ Setara Institute is an organization founded by individuals dedicated to the idea that every individual has to be treated equally and respect diversity, prioritize solidarity and uphold human dignity. This institution was established by people who want to eradicate discrimination and intolerance on the basis of religion, ethnicity, skin color, gender, and other social statuses, and improve solidarity (Setara Institute, 2005).

on radical groups in Indonesia's Central Java and Jogjakarta (Setara Institute, 2012). In this research, a member of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) or Islamic Congregation group, Joko Jihad, was an example of how an intolerant individual became a member of a terrorist group. Meanwhile, the Ightiyalat case, a radical group in Klaten, showed how a radical group can transform into a terrorist group. The research by Setara Institute differentiated radical Islamic groups from terrorist groups. Many radical Islamic groups through their actions had never planned assassination, even though they used violence. Meanwhile, the attempt of terrorist groups is to kill a person of a group of people. A second difference is the nature of the organization. Radical groups that are overt in nature, in contrast to terrorist groups that are led by orders in which only members in higher position know everything.

A Similar research related with radicalism prevention was conducted by Annajih, Lorantina, and Ilmiyana (2017). This research showed a general result in which the concept of multicultural guidance and counseling in radicalism prevention among adolescents is not separated from the concept of adolescent psychological development. The multicultural counseling approach was assumed able to stir the society to respect and accept each other. The majority groups can respect the minorities, and vice versa. The concept of respecting and accepting each other is the principle in nurturing harmony in a pluralistic society (Annajih et al., 2017).

Meanwhile, we conduct the research using the rational-emotive counseling paradigm. This paradigm is used to analyze three levels related to radicalism. First, antecedent event (A) diagnosis level reveals every external event experienced by individuals that causes their behaviors to be radical. Second, belief (B) diagnosis level reveals the belief, view, value, or self-verbalization of an individual or group exposed to radicalism. Third, emotional consequence (C) diagnosis level reveals the effects or reactions of an individual or group exposed to radicalism, in the form of emotion (Dryden, Neenan, & Yankura, 2001, p. 3). This paradigm is used to find development formula of countermeasure model for radicalism by presenting positive psychological concepts of rational beliefs, which are expected to create a harmonic life in a plural society.

Rational-emotive counseling paradigm is used to profoundly study radicalism, especially in accordance with the views of some populist religious organizations, namely Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, and Persatuan Islam (PERSIS).⁴

⁴ NU was founded on 31 January, 1926, as a representation of traditionalist Islamic scholars, with

2. Research Method

This case study is a comprehensive research result wrapped up with extensive data. The type of this research is descriptive-qualitative. The research attempted to describe and interpret the objects as they are (Sukardi, 2008, p. 157). It used a constructivism paradigm because the research explored comprehensions which represent some part of populist religious organizations in Indonesia. Constructivism paradigm considers sciences as a systematic analysis of socially meaningful action through direct and thorough observation toward the social actors involved to create, maintain or manage their social world (Denzin & Lincoln, 2009, p. 137). Based on this paradigm, it is assumed that radicalism is a constructed reality. Therefore, constructivism is a paradigm which regards reality from a subjective perspective. This research falls under a case study research, which is a research aimed to learn intensively about particular social units, including individuals, groups, institutions, and societies (Riyanto, 2002, p. 24).

The research method used in the research is the virtual ethnography,⁵ because the obtained data range around meaning and essence of people's understandings that represent populist religious organizations, namely NU, Muhammadiyah, and PERSIS, which are related with radicalism. By implementing this method, it is expected that the construction of research subjects and objects' understandings on radicalism are captured through digital footprints. The virtual ethnography views technology as a group of symbols with their own meaning, as a form of metaphor which involves a new concept to technology and its relation to social life (Hine, 2000; Howard, 2002; Murthy, 2008).

Through virtual ethnography method, the information source's views on internet

the ideology of *ahlus sunnah waljamaah*. NU was established in Kertopaten, Surabaya. The founding figures include K. H. Hasyim Asy'ari (Muzadi, 1999). Muhammadiyah was founded by Muhammad Darwisy or more known as K. H. Ahmad Dahlan in Kauman, Yogyakarta on 8 Dzulhijjah 1330 H/November 18, 1912. Generally, the supporting factors of Muhammadiyah's birth were religious and moral restlessness and social concern (Febriansyah et al., 2013); PERSIS was established on September 12, 1923 in Bandung. The birth of PERSIS was a response toward Indonesian Muslims that still upheld the pre-Islamic traditions. It hails the idea of Islamic purification (Anshari, 1958).

⁵ Ethnography in the cyberspace aims to give an understanding about the significance and implication of internet usage, and is called as virtual ethnography (Hine, 2000).

about everything related with radicalism was identified and analyzed. Ward (1999) assesses that the involvement of human on internet has inflicted an interaction. An interaction occurred through internet has given birth to cultural artifacts so that the life inside it can be observed using ethnographic method. Murthy (2008) views that the development of technology has encouraged the digitalization of communication to the point that it gives spaces to new social and cultural lives.

In this case, Howard (2002) combines social network analysis with ethnography. He applies network analysis as a justification for case selection. Ethnography encourages the researcher to be directly or indirectly involved with the research subject entirely. Meanwhile computer and internet are the tools to collect data. The studied data are obtained from interactions in internet forums, chat rooms, mailing lists, blog, or social media. Through the global internet network, regional barriers are reduced, so people from different time zone can communicate in the same space. Although it appears “liberal,” research in cyber era should still be conducted openly and accountably and should still heed to established research ethics. The generally accessed realm of cyberspace is called as “surface web.” Data search in a digital footprint is done using search engines like Google (Bergman, 2001). In the context of this study, the collected information is in the form of thoughts and views of several populist religious organizations such as those of NU, Muhammadiyah, and PERSIS figures are accessed because they all are considered as the representations of expression in the reality of the cyberspace, especially those that are related to radicalism and its countermeasures. Therefore, in this case, the researcher is the primary instrument or the key instrument in data collection (Nasution, 2003).

3. Theoretical Framework

From the perspective of sociology, Sartono Kartodirdjo explains that radicalism is a social movement that entirely rejects the social order, characterized by a strong moral expression to oppose and become hostile toward the privileged people and the authorities (Kartodirdjo, 1985, p. 38). Therefore, radicalism fundamentally has a neutral meaning, even in the philosophical study if someone searches for the truth, it has to find the root of it (Nursalim, 2017, p. 336). Therefore, we can conclude that radicalism is a general symptom that can occur in a society with various motives, including social, political, cultural, and religious ones. Within this context, we need a study that uses various approaches.

The study of a science is no longer limited by the formal established rigidity. Therefore, an object can be seen from various formal perspectives to show the extensiveness of knowledge and emphasize the dictum that a science grows and thrives over the establishment of the others. So, in this case, radicalism will be studied from various perspectives, especially from political, social, cultural, economic, and religious ones.

From a political standpoint, radicalism is in the form of actions carried out by social groups, especially marginalized or discriminated people. According to the political theories of Marxism and socialism, this reflects the term social revolution. Radicalism as a fast transformation in the juridical superstructure and political society is deemed legitimate as an effort to fight for the rights of the group (Mills, 2003). In explaining political radicalism, Ted Robert Gurr uses a psychological approach. According to him, political radicalism emerges from a disappointed individual or group. The disappointment is a result of discrepancy of hopes as rights and reality that does not meet the value expectation. This depressed condition is alleged to cause the emergence of people's disappointment, and in the political perspective, the disappointment arises when the authorities (state, capital, or bureaucrat, political party, and so on) are unable to meet the demands of or promises to certain groups under their authority (Gurr, 1970, pp. 2–4). Based on that statement, evidently the main factor of radicalism is the hindrance for someone to self-actualize. Since radicalism is related to the hindrance of someone's right, therefore radicalism is temporal, or in other word it can be eradicated.

To examine this more clearly the theory of Galtung (1980) is used. Galtung conceptualizes radicalism into three forms: cultural radicalism, structural radicalism, and direct radicalism. First, cultural radicalism legitimizes structural and direct radicalism. Direct radicalism (violence-as-action) itself means radicalism with visible actions, therefore it is easily identified. Second, structural radicalism (violence as structure) is in the form of systematic exploitation with a mechanism that prevents the formation of awareness and hampers the existence of institutions that oppose it. The concept of radicalism proposed by Galtung fundamentally gives an understanding that radicalism can be conducted by anyone in any condition, whether it is performed by the state, society, social groups, or even an individual. However, Galtung views that the state as a party has the most potential to eradicate the rights of its citizens in actualizing itself as a state. Further understanding on radicalism in political perspective will arrive to a conclusion that a radical act is not only

performed by the state to its citizen, but it can also be carried out by the society to the regime in power. This type of radicalism is known as political radicalization, which is the radicalism of civilians carried out based on political issues, especially those that involves with the power struggle in political organizations, or those that aims toward the government or political organizations. It can be in the form of revolution, guerilla war, or *coup de tat* (Galtung, 1980; Rule, 1988, pp. 170–171).

Thus we postulate that radicalism from the social perspective can be seen from the functionalist theory. The equilibrium that appears in social life was born out of the order of various synergized elements. This assumption is based on the thought that every structure in a functional social system affects and is connected to each other, so the primary concept in the functionalist theory mostly involves function, dysfunction, latent function, manifest function, and equilibrium. One of the preeminent thinkers in functionalist theory is Emile Durkheim. In talking about radicalism, he proposes a concept called “anomi,” which is a sociological concept to explain the psychological condition of feeling estranged as a result of humanity being uprooted from life. He says that economy is the root of this anomi condition. From the perspective of anomi, radicalism can be understood as a result of social and economic changes that are not accompanied by the change in the regulation system, so the society, or an individual, becomes confused in facing the changes (Ritzer, 2003, p. 21)

Moreover, according to the conflict theory, radicalism emerges as a result of the unequal power distribution. The inequality of power distribution leads to the accumulation of power in one individual, or one group. The group with the power tends to use it to defend their power. In other words, radicalism is conducted as an effort to defend the domination of the group over other groups (Ritzer, 2003, p. 25).

Radicalism from the cultural perspective is an act as an obligation to return injustice. Moreover, according to Radcliffe Brown (cited in Ihromi, 2000), radicalism happens in a warring social group which is supported by the general opinion. Although, according to Leopold Pospisil (cited in Ihromi, 2000), it is uncertain whose general opinion it is, whether it is the opinion of the warring group, or those out of the group. Furthermore, Pospisil says that this general opinion is at least according to the warring group. At first, the attention of anthropologists toward radicalism is related to the continuing dispute between groups or ethnics. Wright perceives the sequences of radicalism that become a characteristic of the dispute is an instrument

in demanding a retaliation or compensation for the damage, or in order to flatter someone or the family of the group that are involved in the dispute. Meanwhile, Brown defines radicalism as customs embraced by the warring groups. In relation with the warring groups, radicalism is considered as an obligation in which its appearance is a manifestation of collective solidarity. Based on that anthropological perspective, radicalism can be defined as one of social systems created by a group to defend their life from the threat of other groups, and also as one of the means to resolve the dispute, or as a mean to demand justice that is deemed to have been violated by the other group (Ihromi, 2000, p. 75).

Radicalism from the economic perspective is always linked to the development equity of a state. Developments are often identical with the effort of “state building and modal accumulation.” Within this context, the development always inflicts changes in the society. Both the changes in physical environment and social environment can bring forth a configuration of social segregation which leads to a collective radicalism (Mas’oed, 2001, p. 18).

Last but not least, radicalism from religious perspective is a symptom arisen from a complex religious understanding. The emergence of the symptom is an accumulation of various factors. As an example, according to Azyumardi Azra, radicalism that develops among Indonesian Muslims has several factors, such as (1) partial understanding toward religious texts, (2) misreading of the Islamic history with excessive idealization toward the existence of Islam in a certain period, (3) a lasting political, social, and economic deprivation in society. At the same time, social-cultural disorientation and dislocation, and globalization become important additional factors for the emergence of radical groups, and (4) the continuing intra-religious and inter-religious social conflicts (Munip, 2014, p. 162).

Meanwhile, the analytical approach of this study uses rational-emotive counseling theory, or the ABCD diagnosis. Antecedent event (A) is every external event explaining or experienced by an individual. It can in the form of facts, occurrence, behaviors, or attitudes of someone. Belief (B) is a belief, view, value, or self-verbalization of an individual toward an event. These are two kinds of belief, namely rational belief or rB and irrational belief or iB. The rational belief is a right, reasonable, wise cerebration or belief system, that is why it is productive. The irrational belief is a wrong, unreasonable, emotional cerebration or belief system, so that’s why it is unproductive. Emotional consequence (C) is an emotional

consequence as a result or reaction of an individual in the form of happiness or emotional barrier in its relationship with the antecedent event (A). The emotional consequence is not a direct result of A, but it is caused by several intermediate variables in the form of belief (B), both the rB and the iB. Meanwhile, dispute (D) is a solution formula in going against the irrational beliefs (Corey, 1995, p. 179). In relation to this our research, therefore the study conducted in the diagnosis level of antecedent event (A) is to reveal every external event experienced by an individual. It refers to predecessor events in the form of facts, occurrence, behaviors, or attitudes of individuals which are linked to the emergence of radical views, acts, and groups assumed to be involved in terrorist movements from the perspectives of NU, Muhammadiyah, and PERSIS. The diagnosis level of belief (B) is to discover the belief, view, values, or self-verbalization of an individual or group toward an event from the perspectives of NU, Muhammadiyah, and PERSIS. The diagnosis level of emotional consequence (C) is to unveil the consequences or reactions of an individual or group in the form of happiness or emotional barrier in its relationship with antecedent event (A) from the perspectives of NU, Muhammadiyah, and PERSIS. Finally, the level of dispute resolution (D) is the development of persuasive countermeasure model related to the irrational beliefs that has put the views of the society on radical and terrorist movements into discord.

4. Result and Discussion

The populist religious organizations, represented by NU, Muhammadiyah, and PERSIS, perceive that the conflicts occurred in Indonesia have shaken up the national foundation established by the Indonesian founding fathers as the national motto, *bhinneka tunggal ika* (unity in diversity). The empirical facts show that there is a relation between primordial conflicts and radical actors that use religious symbols. There is an increasing trend of cases in Indonesia. In other words, beside the communal primordial sentiment, Indonesia is also faced with radicalism that leads to terrorism.

The former Chair of Central Java Regional Boards of NU, K. H. Bukhori Masruri, along with Muslih Nashoha elaborated that the first radicalism in Islam existed since the time of al Khawarij sect or faction (translated as “to walk out”) who assassinated the 4th caliph, Ali ibn Abi Talib. Until now, the tradition of Khawarij

are still abundant and has become a kind of model. The pattern is still the same, which is act fundamentally. It means, as Bukhari says, to consider every teachings of the Prophet Muhammad as fundamental, whether it is obligatory or recommended, forbidden, or disapproved. "Radicalism will still exist as long as the root exists. To eradicate it, we have to know the root, which is, the narrow and literal understanding of Koranic texts," states Masruri (Niam, 2011). The consequence of textual, narrow, and literal interpretation is the birth of religious behaviors that easily claim truth based on their own groups which results in judging other groups in disdain (Fadjar, 2000). Besides the interpretation aspect as the source of radicalism, there are also other aspects.

Another aspect that gives birth to radicalism is caused by the existence of social inequality as a result of economic policies. Economic policy also gives birth to conglomeration. Masruri assesses that the government economic policies sometimes give wide spaces for the conglomerates to increase their wealth. In consequence, a social conflict can arise. Therefore, radicalism can appear from two sources of problem. First, from political problem. The political problem meant is an injustice. Here, the political interests play a part to exploit marginalized people to be recruited to conduct radicalism. Then, the political actors find the benefit from radicalism. Second, from economical problem. Economic inequity often causes the poor to become frustrated to the point that they will do anything for money. Religious radicalism can be born from political desires of several elites of religious groups, and easily frustrated groups, not only from the religious society itself. "Several a priori people see the problem and assume that they are right. This is what triggers the problem," he explains (NU Online, 2003). "If Indonesian economy weakens, it will trigger the terrorist groups more to fight against the government" (Suara Muhammadiyah, 2016a).

Radicalism is not born from an empty space. In social theory, radicalism is a movement involved with or caused by another fact. Through the perspective of social facts, there are three assumptions based on the whole ways of thinking, which are the existence of social order, the occurrence of change once upon a time, and there is no fact that stands alone except if there is another fact that caused it. The root of radicalism can be seen from several causes, namely:

- (1) A political pressure from the authorities: In several parts of the world, including Indonesia, the phenomena of radicalism or fundamentalism is borne out

of authoritarianism. In the case of the Indonesian New Order era, the state attempted to always eliminate every identified radical movement (Thaba, 1995). During this era, radicalism was the number one enemy and became the common enemy through various transformational mass media, whether it is left or right radicalism. Left radicalism such as the New Left Movement, which once developed in Indonesia during 1980s and kept gaining momentum in 1990s through the People's Democratic Party (PRD), was an exponent organization regarded as a national enemy. The pressure toward this left-radical group was so severe that many of their notable figures were arrested, tortured, and even disappeared without trace. The New Order era was also focused towards the right radicalism, too. Among of those that are prominent is the issue of the Jihad Command during mid-1980s. Many Islamic figures identified as leaders or members of the Komando Jihad were arrested and imprisoned. The attempts to eradicate radical Islamic groups kept being conducted until the period when the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals was born in mid-1990s.

- (2) Religious emotional factor: It has to be recognized that one of the causes of radicalism movement is a religious sentiment factor, including the religious solidarity for oppressed fellows by particular powers. In another words, the cause is not solely the religion itself (absolute holy revelation) but rather religious sentiments, because the radical movements always waved the flag and religious symbols as a pretext of defending religion, jihad, and *šahīd* or committing martyrdom. In this context, what it means is by a religious emotion and is as an interpretative understanding of reality, which is relative and subjective. The involvement of religious emotional factor is reflected by the occurrences of mass riot during the beginning of the reformation era, in which hundreds of church and workplaces of Indonesians of Chinese ethnicity were burned, destroyed, and plundered. In May 1998, the discriminative-nuanced riots killed more than a thousand victims. Riots outside Jakarta, including in East Timor, Poso, Ambon, Sambas, and other places are a long list of riots with religious and ethnic conflict took place (Rachman, 2010, p. 57). For more recently occurred violent acts, for example, were the violent acts between Islam Defenders Front or Front Pembela Islam (FPI) and the Ahmadiyya sect in Cikeusik, and the riot in Temanggung, Lombok in eastern Indonesia, as well as the conflict between factions of the Shia sect and NU (Syiah and Sunni) in Madura which had a religious component.

- (3) Cultural factor: This factor plays a quite big role which resulted in the emergence of radicalism. It is reasonable because culturally, as stated by Asyarie (1992, p. 95), in society there was an attempt to break away from particular cultural chains that are deemed incompatible. Meanwhile the meaning of the cultural factor is as an antithesis toward secular culture as found in the ideals of the Indonesian original constitution or the *Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 (UUD '45)*. Some of the radicals believed that Western culture is a source of secularism regarded as an enemy that must be eliminated from earth. Meanwhile, historical facts show the existence of Western as perceived domination in all aspects of Muslim cultures and countries. The spread of western civilization is a dominant and universal expression of mankind. Some of the radicals believe The West has deliberately performed marginalization in every aspect of Muslim lives which caused the Muslims to be left behind and oppressed. The west with secularism has been considered to taint Eastern and Islamic cultures and regarded as the biggest threat of Islamic moralities. This can be seen from daily changes, such as the massive increase of religious community's consumption of Western products, such as automated teller machines (ATMs), mobile phone, the Internet, and other global products (Qodir, 2011).
- (4) Anti-Westernism ideological factor: Westernism as the result of colonialization has been part of country's history. However, Westernism by some is considered as a dangerous view by Indonesian Muslims who aim to implement the sharia law. Even though anti-West movement and motivation cannot be blamed based on completely on religious reason, the violent ways that the radicalism follows show their inability in positioning themselves as an effective competitor in culture and civilization. Latif (2016) emphasizes that the birth of terrorism is caused by the non-functional sense of justice concept. Terrorists appear as a consequence of a blossoming skepticism toward democracy. Democracy is regarded as a government system of the *kafirs* (Mukhlisin, 2011).
- (5) Government policy factor: The inability of the government in Muslim countries to fix the situation of increasing frustration and anger from a partial Muslims caused by ideological, military, and economic domination from developed countries. In this case, the government elites in Muslim countries has not yet found the core of violent acts (radicalism), so they cannot resolve the social problems faced by the society. Within this context, one of the sources of

radicalism cannot be separated from the injustice practices in Indonesia. One of the signs of injustice is the rampant corruption in every level of society. The rampant corruption results in the radical resistance from the people as a form of disbelief toward the policies released by the government (see Kurniawan, 2014).

- (6) Mass media factor: Some in the West frequently link the religion as a factor of the birth or cause of violence conducted by Muslims. Propagandas through mass media have an immense power which is difficult to be repelled; therefore some “extreme” actions are carried out as a reaction toward what was befallen to Muslim communities. For instances, see the film, *Fitna* (2012), which illustrate the apocalypse, and others (Ibrahim, 2007).

Objectively, it can be understood that radical movements within the above antecedent event (A) analysis emerge because of several events related to the strong pressure of the political regime in power, where some Islamic groups are not given the freedom of speech; secular ideology fails in upholding justice, moral, and people’s prosperity, so religious radicalism is born and believed as the only alternative for Muslims (Azhar, 2001, pp. 122–123).

Furthermore, we will discuss the result related to the views of NU, Muhammadiyah, and PERSIS on radicalism within the belief (B) analysis approach. Three things need to be addressed, namely the ideas of Islamic caliphate, jihad, and *takfiri* (NU Online, 2015).

The next thing to be discussed is the stances of NU, Muhammadiyah, and PERSIS on radicalism based on the belief analysis approach. Three points that need to be addressed are on the Islamic caliphate, jihad, and *takfiri*. These points have empirically become the main symbols of several radical groups. These terms are understood scripturally, in other words a literal and textual understanding of Quran verses. They reject hermeneutics as a method in understanding Quran. Therefore, the interpretations of religious texts or symbols become narrow. This narrow understanding will give birth to a rejection toward pluralism and relativism as they will be considered as spoiling the holiness of the text. Eventually, the narrow interpretation will cause truth monopolizing behavior of religious interpretation, in which they regard themselves as the most authorized in interpreting the holy book and view the others as stray groups (Marty, 1992, pp. 3–13). Within this context, we further explain those three themes.

- (1) On caliphate: According to Ali (2014), “Al Qaeda,⁶ and IS, as radical group representatives deem the caliphate as the only political system in Islam, while the others are kaffir. The difference is Al Qaeda is still in a form of discourse, meanwhile IS has proclaimed the caliphate,” he adds. Meanwhile for NU, the caliphate is not a political system or a state model, but a leadership concept as stated in the second chapter of the Koran, Al Baqarah, verse 30. NU and other Indonesian Islamic scholars from other organizations such as Muhamadiyah, Sarikat Islam (Islamic Union), and other nationalists have agreed on the political system based on the Pancasila⁷ as a mutual *ijtihad* (agreement), therefore other political system is deemed unnecessary.
- (2) On jihad: The radicalism groups define jihad in a narrow sense, i.e., in only a war and violent sense. However, jihad in a persuasive, education, and *dawah* (preaching) sense and other social activities is not regarded as jihad. The view differs with the views of majority Islamic scholars who regard fighting against carnal desire is the biggest jihad. Jihad in a war sense is only one of the varieties of jihad. For NU scholars, jihad is not narrowly defined as *qital* (war), but it is extensive, including building peace and order as a fundament of world civilization.
- (3) *Takfiri* or declaring other Muslims as *kafir* (infidels): Radicalism groups believe that the others outside their circle are heathens. It means that the majority of Muslims are deemed under that category. Some of them perceive that the infidels should be fought, except if they pay a special *jizya* (tax). Meanwhile, the majority of scholars argue otherwise. The scholars consider *takfiri* toward fellow Muslims as dismissing plurality as a human nature.

Historically, radicalism is a view which tends to extremely fight for something, in which the actors are the followers of conservative and reactionary religious movements. The majority of radicalisms are political protest movements expressed

⁶ Al Qaeda was categorized as an international terrorist organization by the USA, Europe Union, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and several other countries. Al Qaeda was founded by Osama bin Laden, Abdullah Azzam, and some other Arab volunteers with the initial goal of driving away the Soviet Union during the Afghanistan War.

⁷ Pancasila is the ideology of Indonesia. The name is derived from two Sanskrit words: *pañca* means five and *śīla* means a principle or basis. Pancasila is the national and state foundation for all Indonesian people.

by religious theme using radical actions. The radical groups have an epistemological view that Islam is the only way of life which should be implemented without considering the impacts toward the rights of other groups or religions (Sagiv, 1997, p. 4). This epistemological view gives birth to several behavioral motives that become the characteristics of radical movements.

The characteristics of the radical movements include: (1) They tend to move based on a strong hatred toward the West. (2) They believe in the return of past glory of Islam. (3) They believe that the utmost struggle is to apply Islamic sharia in the government structure. (4) They believe that Islam is a religion and a state. (5) They believe that the past is a guidance for the revolutionary future (Husein, 2001, p. 166).

Conceptually, the dispute resolution (D) attempt in the form of deradicalization conducted by NU and Muhammadiyah has been served as role social models of Islam Nusantara and Progressive Islam Movement (Gerakan Islam Berkemajuan) which are tolerant and moderate. In this case, Tito Karnavian, as the former Chief of Indonesian National Police, states that currently a moderate ideology competitor is needed to muffle the massive spread of radicalism in society. "Terrorism cannot be resolved with only capturing and shooting the actors. A counter ideology is done by moderating their radical narration," Karnavian declared this during the discussion of "Deradicalization Symposium" at Bidakara Hotel, Jakarta Selatan, in January 19, 2017. Karnavian elaborates, the role of religious figures is needed to help the government eradicate terrorism. The spread of radical views done by terrorist groups often done through ideological narration by citing multi-interpretative Koranic verses. He gave as an example Islam Nusantara as a concept among NU as one of the ideological competitors (Erdianto, 2017).

In the same occasion, a terrorism observer, Al Chaidar, said that deradicalization program is important to be done as a counter-discourse. The method was once implemented by the Spanish government to suppress the radical groups who used holy book verses. "It is the same as in Indonesia. The discourse voiced out need interpretation and monolithic. However, no one fights against it here. Therefore, NU and Muhammadiyah have the most potential because of their huge number of followers," he said (Erdianto, 2017).

NU's idea of Islam Nusantara and Muhammadiyah with Progressive Islam Movement are viewed by several parties as social models able to reinforce toward more rational and logical behavior by deconstructing the irrational value and belief

system of radicalism followers and replacing it with a positive value system. Islam Nusantara, according to the former Vice General Chief of the NU National Board, Slamet Effendi Yusuf, mentioned that a moderate and tolerant Islamic teaching is necessary. Islam Nusantara is a blessing to all creation (*rahmatan lil alamin*). Islam came not to eliminate everything in this world, but to complete it, including customs and traditions. NU itself, he continued, accepts the plural condition of Indonesian society. Therefore, every exclusive thing, for instance a nation based on religion, cannot be accepted by this largest Islamic organization in Indonesia. The Indonesia state is final. That is what Islam Nusantara is, which perceives everything moderately,” he affirms (Tiba, 2015).

Islam Nusantara exists not to shift the purity of Islam, but to be an affirmation that Islam lives in Indonesia peacefully by adapting local cultures and traditions. The historical conscience of Indonesian Muslims should be built, therefore the Islamic teaching orientation as taught by the first three generations of Muslims (*salafuna sholih*) in Indonesia will preserve. Along with the development of time, the existence of Islam in Indonesia is barred by transnational puritan group movements. The unique feature of Islam in Indonesia is deemed to have lost the originality of Islam itself. The openness of Islam in Indonesia is to accommodate the acculturation result with local cultures and traditions.

Islam Nusantara can be the counter-radicalism because it has the characteristics of *ahlusunnah waljama'ah* teachings, which can be translated into “the followers of Prophet Muhammad’s traditions and Muslim scholars’ *ijma* (agreements).” The characteristics include: moderate (*tawasuth*) character, as the most prominent characteristic of *ahlussunnah waljamaah* school, and act justly (*itidal*), act equally (*tawazun*), and tolerant (*tasamuh*); therefore it rejects any form of extreme (*tatharruf*) action and view that can give birth to any distortion and deviation of Islamic teachings. Its religious views also develop a balance (middle ground) between the use of revelation (*naqliyah*) and rationality (*'aqliyah*) so it enables to accommodate with the changes in society as long as it does not oppose dogmatic doctrines (Dhofier, 1994, pp. 65, 148).

The result of the PERSIS digital footprint of tracing shows that they have only supported it. As the headquarters’ of the organization released, “We support any government effort in their resolves according to Indonesian constitutional law, especially in breaking the chains of every potential and cause of radicalism movement” (Sigabah.com, 2016). Moreover, the headquarter of PERSIS also

persuades the society to be level-headed, not provoked, and participate by helping the authority to anticipate a follow-up terror by giving an early information if there is any suspicious indication (Sigabah.com, 2016).

Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah, as NU does, has similar conceptual efforts. These efforts orient more toward the development and strategic partnership patterns with any party without losing their identity as an independent civil society movement. In a national seminar of “Moderation of Radicalism Antithesis and Deradicalization” at the Muhammadiyah headquarters in Yogyakarta, its leader, Haedar Nashir, announced that Muhammadiyah will not oppose deradicalization attempts (Ridarineni, 2016). On the contrary, an action to counter radicalism within some limitation is necessary to be conducted (Suara Muhammadiyah, 2016b). With this concept of moderation, Dr. Haedar Nashir explained that Muhammadiyah wants to clarify the concept of jihad comprehensively so there won’t be any misinterpretation or misuse by any individual from any group.

5. Conclusions

This research on radicalism with rational-emotive analysis approach resulted in several conclusions as follows:

- (1) The birth of Islamic radical view in Indonesia is not separated from the past historical factor. The embryo of this movement has existed since the period of the New Order era but came up to the surface because of the reformation which gives space for transnational ideology to exist and develop.
- (2) Based on the antecedent event analysis, according to Muhammadiyah, NU, and PERSIS based on their digital footprints, the root of radicalism can be seen from several factors, namely: first, the political pressure from the authorities toward their existence; second, the religious emotional factor; third, cultural factor; fourth, anti-Westernism ideological factor; fifth, government policy factor; sixth, western mass media factor which always put the Muslim community into a corner.
- (3) Based on the belief analysis, according to Muhammadiyah, NU, and PERSIS based on their digital footprints, that: first, the birth of belief followed by claiming a single truth and misleading other opposing groups; second, the belief of the radicals complicates the Islamic religion which is fundamentally simple (*samhah*) by claiming recommended worships as obligatory and reprehensible

worships as forbidden. Radicalism is characterized by a religious behavior that prioritizes secondary problems and puts aside the primaries; third, radical groups tend to be excessive in their religious worships; fourth, they interact rudely, speak harshly, and preach temperamentally; fifth, they easily distrust others outside their groups; sixth, they easily label others with opposing opinion as kaffirs.

- (4) Based on the dispute resolution analysis, according to Muhammadiyah, NU, and PERSIS based on their digital footprints, conceptually the dispute resolution attempt in the form of deradicalization conducted by NU and Muhammadiyah use tolerant and moderate role social models, the Islam of Nusantara and Progressive Islam Movement. Meanwhile, PERSIS does not have any role social model yet. NU ideas of the Islam of Nusantara and Muhammadiyah Progressive Islam Movement are considered by several parties as social models and are capable of reinforcing the rational and logic behavior by deconstructing irrational value and belief systems of the radicalists and replacing it with a positive value system which stands on moderate (*tawasuth*), equal (*tawazun*), justice (*adalah*), tolerant (*tasamuh*), and unity (*muzyarokah*) principles.

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